

MYSTERIES OF THE 112 INTELLIGENCE CORP GROUP

presented by Larry Hancock

One of the ongoing areas of mystery and speculation in regard to events in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963 has been the activities of the 112th Army Intelligence unit. The documents available to us now appear to resolve many of these mysteries, all except the most fundamental one – the actual role of the 112th in Dallas.

This paper and its related document collection address the following “mysteries”:

1. Organization, mission and personnel of the 112th Intelligence Corps Group (INTC)
2. Organization, mission and personnel of the 316th Intelligence Corps Detachment
3. Activities of 112th Group II (Dallas) personnel on November 22, 1963
4. Performance of “Protective Service” duties by the 112th INTC
5. The role of Specialist James Powell and the history of his TSBD photograph
6. Possible identification of 112th personnel as “mystery” Secret Service agents
7. The role of Warrant Office Edward Coyle; attendance at the Armory robbery meeting on November 22, 1963
8. Errors in the sworn testimony and statements of Col. Jones, 112th INTC G2 officer
9. Errors or “contradictory” intelligence in 112th and 4th Army intelligence reports
10. “Stand-Down” of the 316th Detachment on November 22, 1963

Why there should be any mystery in regard to the role of the 112th is itself perplexing since we have access to extended, sworn interviews with its Operations Officer, first with the Church Committee and then the HSCA. In addition, we now have an extensive investigation by the ARRB and further interviews with additional group personnel.

Unfortunately, as we will see, the statements by these individuals are totally at odds with each other and with the statements and reports of Secret Service Dallas trip lead agent Lawson as well as with memoranda from the Department of Defense and 112th unit history. In fact, we now know that the purported Operations Officer giving sworn statements to the Church and House Select Committees never held the position

he specified and was serving as intelligence officer (G2), not operations officer (G3). It is also now clear that we lack any statements from 112th Group Commander, the actual 112th Operations Officer and either the Dallas Unit commander or his Deputy Commander — indeed all of the officers in direct line of command for any unit field activities in Dallas during the Presidential visit.

However, we do have intelligence “spot” reports transmitted from the 112th personnel in Dallas to their headquarters in San Antonio and relayed to other government organizations. They give us a picture of the type of information that the 112th was collecting in Dallas, its sources within the DPD and they allow us to judge the quality and effect of this information. What

we see in the Dallas reports and the information relayed by Col. Jones, the unit's G2 Intelligence officer, shows the unit to have been involved in intelligence collection -- not in protective service as maintained by the same Col. Jones in his statements to the Church and House Select Committees.

The organization and mission of the 112th INTC and 316th as military units is far from mysterious and has been further documented in great detail by the work of the ARRB.^{1, 2, 3, 4, 7}

The United States Army was and is organized into a series of Regional Army Commands. Each of these commands being staffed with integrated resources including intelligence/counter intelligence organizations. The command assigned to the Southern region of the US in 1963 was the Fourth Army and its intelligence unit -- the 112th Military Intelligence (INTC) Corps Group was headquartered, along with Fourth Army itself, in San Antonio, Texas at Fort Sam Houston.

The 112th was structured into seven operating regions encompassing five states -- Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico. The regional units maintained physical offices and limited staffs in major metropolitan centers. Region II staff were located at 902 Rio Grande, in the Rio Grande Building, Dallas. The Region II unit in Dallas was commanded, in the Fall of 1963, by Lt. Col. Roy Pate and his Deputy Commander was Lt. Col. Edgar Boyd.

The unit history also lists a Col. Willard W. Mize as overall 112th INTC Group Commander -- with his G3 Operations Officer as Lt. Col. Stanley Greer and his S2 Intelligence Officer as Lt. Col. Robert Jones.

The Operations/S3 for the 112th had been Col. Reich, however, in December of 1962 the 316 INTC detachment had been transferred from Fort Jackson, South Carolina to Fort Sam Houston and attached to the 112th. Actually no people or equipment moved with the transfer and 316 members were still designated as 316th -- the Region I (San Antonio) 112th commander was initially designated acting 316th detachment commander. The 316th would eventually emerge as a truly separate unit in 1964, once staffing slots were back filled, but during 1963 it appears that personnel assigned to the 316th assumed tasks within Region I and their activities are actually reported under Region I in the 112th unit history. Whether or not the 316th performed any unique activities or whether it operated outside of San Antonio is unclear. Col. Reich being moved to become 316 Detachment Commander in July of 1963 and his S3 Operations officer position was filled by Lt. Col. Stanley Greer.

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The ARRB determined from unit records that Col. Jones was never assigned to the position of S3/Operations and served as S2/Intelligence Officer in 1963 and later was reassigned to 112th Group Executive Officer in 1964. This is of considerable importance as the Group Intelligence officer only reviews reports, collects intelligence and prepares reports for Headquarters; the S2 has no role in field operations or tactical assignments of unit personnel.

The primary function of the 112th was intelligence collection and, as noted, the intelligence officer in November 1963 was Lt. Col. Robert E. Jones. Unit activities normally included background investigations, domestic intelligence against suspect subversive or potentially disruptive organizations and counter intelligence against suspected enemy agents, fellow travelers or potential intelligence leaks. Most of the work of the 112th involved either standard security background checks, security inspections of 4th Army units, however it also engaged in limited monitoring and maintaining files on individuals and groups seen as domestic intelligence targets.

The 112th, as all the Regional Military Intelligence Groups, provided information to the FBI as well as to Police Departments and indeed worked at establishing close connections to major police departments in order to use their internal resources (including their Special Services Groups -- actually police counter intelligence, often known as "Red Squads"). It would not be uncommon to find a MIG performing surveillance on the same individuals or groups as a police department or the ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms) and to also find them sharing information among themselves and with the FBI. Indeed in Dallas on November 22, members of all 3 groups were meeting in regard to an ongoing inquiry into armory thefts and gun running to Cuban exiles.⁸ SA Hosty of the FBI and MI SA Coyle of the 112th independently corroborate this meeting on the morning of November 22. Coyle's interview with the ARRB provides background on that investigation and the inter-agency miscues which led him to call the meet-

ing.^{9,18}

Unfortunately, the statements of both Coyle and Hosty are in direct conflict with that of Col. Jones. Jones stated in his HSCA testimony that "Captain" Ed Coyle was on duty on November 22 performing Secret Service liaison for the Presidential trip – while Agent Hosty states in his autobiography that Ed Coyle spent the morning of November 22 in a multi-agency meeting. This is only one of many instances where the statements of Col. Jones is counter to that of all the personnel stationed in Dallas — in addition he misstates Coyle's actual rank (which was Specialist 5th, with a later promotion to Warrant Officer).

An example of the unit's intelligence work can be seen in a report from Region I in San Antonio dated November 1, 1963; this report is on the "Cuban Officer Training Program" and examines in detail efforts being made by Manolo Artine to recruit veterans of the Bay of Pigs who were then in special officer training courses. Cubans were being aggressively recruited to join a revolutionary training camp in Nicaragua. These individuals were being told that the US had abandoned them but that Artine was going to be receiving support from both France and Germany.¹⁰

In their counter-intelligence role, agents of the 112/316th had been very much involved in observing and collecting information on Lee Oswald's FPCC activities in New Orleans. Indeed its agents collected handbills from his first leafleting beside the carrier WASP and their files contained the name Hidel from those handbills as well as the name Oswald. Col. Jones maintained, and it seems quite reasonable, that the Oswald file at the 112th was opened based on Oswald's New Orleans activities.^{7,11}

We know a good deal about the organization, mission and roles of the 112th. However we have two completely different versions as to what a dozen of its personnel were or were not doing in Dallas on November 22 and we have a major conflict over one of the key photographs taken of the TSBD by 112th Special Agent James Powell.

The contradiction arises entirely from the testimony of Col. Jones, given under oath. Jones was initially interviewed by the Church Committee who seemed largely concerned with whether his personnel could have been any of the mystery men seen in Dealey Plaza — and whether their credentials or self identification could have been as Secret Service Agents. It is unclear why the Church and HSCA committees selected Col. Jones given that he was not the Dallas Commander nor in the direct 112th chain of command at all.

However his statements on 112th activities in his HSCA testimony are very clear and very concrete.¹¹

As to his duties, Jones states:

"Upon my assignment to the 112th, I was appointed the Operations Officer for the entire group...I was directly responsible for all counterintelligence operations, background investigations, domestic intelligence and any specials operations in this area."

The most basic question about November 22, 1963 was whether or not the 112th deployed personnel in Dallas to perform Protective Services in support of the Secret Service.

Col. Jones himself gave a firm "Yes" to that question:

"We provided a small force – I do not recall how many but I would estimate between 8 and 12 — during the Presidential trip to San Antonio Texas and then the following day, on his visit to Dallas. The Regions also provided additional people to assist."

This clearly suggests that local Dallas personnel were augmented by additional 112th staff and that their mission was protective service

Jones goes to some length to state that his people were "under the control and supervision of the Secret Service" and were to "supplement the manpower of the Secret Service."

Col. Jones further states that Ed Coyle and "Captain" James Powell were among the local Dallas personnel assigned to these duties:

"James Powell was one of those liaison personnel...he was a Captain and also wore civilian clothes and was assigned to Region 2 of the 112th MIG. He was on duty the day of the assassination."

Col. Jones goes on to state that he was never informed that Captain Powell had taken a photograph of the Texas School Book Depository Building and that a copy of the photograph was never submitted to the 112th; he describes Captain Powell as being "negligent" in his actions in regard to the photograph.

Note: Powell's records and ARRB interview show him

to have been a Specialist, probably a Sergeant (E5) at this time and not an officer; his file also contains a report prepared for his Region II commander in which he mentions taking a photograph of the TSBD with his private camera — this memo does not state that he was not on duty at the time but does describe him going to his office after the incident. His FBI report of January 3, 1964, states that he turned the photograph in question over to Lt. Col. E. E. Boyd of Region II, Army Intelligence in Dallas and also mentions that he observed a Negro male in one of the windows at the time of taking the photograph. In his ARRB interview Powell states that none of his group were involved with the Presidential trip in any way and that none of them participated in Protective Service. He makes it clear that he was not on duty but had taken leave to observe the motorcade and hopefully take pictures of the President's visit.^{12, 13, 14, 15}

Col. Jones also gives an elaborate description of how his group functioned in conjunction with the Secret Service when called on for such assignments. Interestingly enough, although VIP Protection is discussed in the Standard Operating Procedures for the 316th (which happens to be in the ARRB records) the type of protection it addresses is much more comprehensive and seems to be written for situations where the Army has primary responsibility for security — such as the visit of a VIP to a base or Army operations area. Col. Jones does indeed seem to be comfortable with Secret Service liaison duties beyond that of his unit's normal duties.⁷

But more importantly, because of the assassination, we have access to the detailed preparations by the Secret Service for Dallas, including Dallas Secret Service lead man SA Lawson's trip summary and post-assassination report. In addition the DPD generated extensive reporting of their preparations including lists of all planning meetings and the agencies and personnel represented.¹⁶

SA Lawson himself was especially detailed in listing all meetings and attendees down to the Fire Department, Trade Center employees and Airport personnel. All groups involved in security arrangements including back up personnel from the Sheriffs Department and Texas Department of Public Safety are described. Nowhere in any of Lawson's reports or in the Dallas Police reports is any mention made of contact with or support by members of the 112th or 316th, or any military personnel at all.

Additionally, the Department of Defense advised

“ ...Why Col. Jones was selected to explain their role to two Congressional committees and lied under oath.”

the HSCA that no record of any request or action for protective support exists in regard to the Dallas visit of the President.⁵

When all the current evidence is considered, it seems that the fundamental mystery of the 112th is not whether or not they were deployed for protective service in Dallas but rather why Col. Jones was selected to explain their role to two Congressional committees and why he appears to have consistently lied under oath. Interestingly enough, his first testimony to the Church Committee was largely devoted to presenting information which convinced the committee that 112th personnel could very well have been mistaken for the “mystery” agents with credentials reported in Dealey Plaza. We now know this to have not have been the case for 112th personnel in general and SA Powell specifically.¹⁷

One point of speculation might be that the mystery of these men with credentials may have been a part of an ongoing assassination cover up, otherwise we are left with an Army Col. who is either an inveterate liar or totally incompetent and unreliable (the conclusion apparently reached by the ARRB — based on their internal memos).

We do know a good deal about the intelligence collection activities of the 112th on November 22, primarily based on a series of “Spot” reports as well as memos from Col. Powell to other agencies and FBI memos relating his reports. These reports also give us a good idea of at least some of the 112th's routine Dallas Police contacts.¹⁸

One report identifies information as originating with Captain Dowdy — in actuality this is George M. Doughty who was in charge of the Identification Bureau within the DPD Services division. For reference it is important to note that Captain Doughty was the officer in charge of the Identification group located on the fourth floor of the DPD offices. This group was part of the Services division which included the Crime Scene Unit, the Photo section, Fingerprint section and records section. Given the background and counterintelligence tasks of the 112th is certainly makes sense for them to have a connection to the ID group. With Captain Doughty as a source, it would appear that they

should have been getting solid and reliable intelligence about the identity and possessions of individuals taken into custody on November 22.

This brings us to the other unresolved mystery of the 112th, nothing more or less than the fact that the majority of the information given to them and reported by them to various agencies was either incorrect, inaccurate or actively suppressed — since it did not become a part of the official investigation or record. To appreciate this we have to take a look at it item by item.

Apparently the first formal intelligence passed to Col. Jones was the identity of the suspected assassin. According to Jones he was given only the name "Hidel" with no mention of "Oswald" and no reference to multiple ID's or the use of an alias. Indeed Col. Jones is on record as being able to provide the DPD with the information that Hidel was very likely Lee Oswald, based on the cross index listings in the Oswald file and the earlier information from New Orleans. Obviously this is in significant contrast to portions of the official record including statements by a variety of arresting officers that both names, multiple identifications documents and the use of an alias were known from the very beginning and even transmitted by radio from the patrol car carrying Oswald (said statements however are not confirmed by the radio transmission log).

By Friday evening, a lengthy report was provided to the 112th by the DPD detailing the circumstances of an incident in Dealey Plaza early that week. This incident involved men who were observed by civilians and officers in the area of the "grassy knoll" fence, apparently "sighting in" a rifle. One of the men was described as clearly fitting the description of the subject (Oswald) and the car associated with the incident was stated to fit the description which the subject (Oswald) had been seen driving. This would later cause some confusion since no DPD report of this incident or any of this information is in evidence and the facts of this report present a major contradiction to the official historical record.

By late in the evening, the situation had escalated to the point where Fourth Army Intelligence developed a urgent cable which contained the information that Oswald had been proven to be a "card carrying Communist" and that he had "defected to Cuba in 1959." This urgent advisory cable was sent to the US Strike Command at McDill AFB in Florida. Strike Command was, at the time, the combined services quick reaction military force which had command and control over operational Army groups (McDill was also heavily focused on Cuban intelligence gathering). Col. Jones

was questioned about this cable by the HSCA and denied having had any knowledge of it at the time or of the 112th having provided any of the information referenced in the cable. He stated that such information was in contrast to that in his file on Oswald/Hidel.

According to this report, the 112th had obtained these pieces of information from officer Stringfellow of the DPD Criminal Intelligence section. Stringfellow reported to Lt. Jack Revill's command and this unit was charged with investigating crimes of an organized nature, subversive activities, racial matters and labor racketeering. The CI unit, along with the Vice Squad and Narcotics squad reported to Captain W. P. Gannaway (a reserve Army Intelligence officer). Certainly it makes good sense that the 112th would be in communications with Revill's unit, however, it surely did not seem to be getting accurate information in terms of the official story. And if we believe Jones, Fourth Army gathered the information for its STRIKE command report from the Dallas Police organization though some other channel than its own intelligence organization.

Note: Lt. Revill also initiated a major controversy by relating FBI agent Hosty's remarks that the FBI was aware of Oswald and the fact that he was capable of violent actions.

In the end then, while the organization and mission of the 112th is no mystery, there are two very large open questions which relate to the unit. The first being why their commander would aggressively present what surely appears to be a false story of the 112th performing Protective Service in Dallas and having deployed a considerable number of personnel to do so.

The second open question has to do with the information being passed to the 112th. Was it simply incorrect or does it reflect reality? Reality before a cover-up? In regard to the information from the Identification Section and Captain Doughty, we really have to wonder whether or not the first available identity for the man taken into custody at the Texas Theatre was A. Hidel and whether that was the only identification provided to the DPD in the initial billfold turned into the ID section.

In regard to the information from Lt. Revill's DPD intelligence unit, I would suggest that the question would be why apparent untruths were given to the 112th — unless we can find some record that anyone in Dallas or even the media thought Oswald to be a Cuban defector? Or that the DPD has failed to share with us a CPUSA card with Oswald's name on it (or would that be Hidel?). Of course, Oswald he did show a CPUSA

card to Sylvia Duran in Mexico City and Hoover was talking about multiple trips by Oswald to Cuba that afternoon...perhaps the 112th had the real story on Nov. 22 and it never made it into the official record?

One final area of speculation pertaining to the 112th is that of the widely circulated “Stand Down” of military protection in Dallas. This story originated in a contact between a former member of the 316th and Col. Fletcher Prouty.²⁰

The ARRB devoted considerable attention to Col. Prouty’s information and interviewed Col. Prouty in depth as well as the former 316th commander, Col. Rudolph Reich. In his ARRB interview, Fletcher Prouty makes it clear that an unnamed individual called him (the call was unsolicited and Prouty did not personally know the individual) and described that the unit had at first been ordered to deploy in Dallas and then called back at the last moment — creating a major protest by the 316th detachment commander and his deputy. Col. Prouty did not provide a name for the caller to the ARRB although he states the caller represented himself as an officer of the 316th. However, in one of Col. Prouty’s earlier papers he does name the caller and he is listed on the 316th staff roster as a PFC, Private First Class.²¹

The ARRB interviewed Col. Prouty at length and was also able to locate and interview the 316th commander, Col. Reich. Col. Reich directly denied the stand-down story and elaborated on the fact that his unit never did protective service, had no special training and that he had personally written a letter to the Army requesting advice as to possible legal responses to the story of the stand-down. It is unclear what if any advice he was given but he did provide a copy of the letter to the ARRB.²²

CONCLUSION and SUMMARY

References and Sources obtained through the work, files and gracious support of Malcolm Blunt, Debra Conway and Anna Marie Kuhns-Walko) with advice and counseling on military history files of the 112th from Larry Haapanen.

Note: The majority of the documents containing statements by individual members of the 112th and 316th, the organizational and personnel documents pertaining to the 112th and the various 112th “Spot” reports and other related reports as well as a variety of internal ARRB memos and investigation assessments are contained in the booklet and CD-Rom “Mysteries of the 112th” published by and available though JFK Lancer. All documents were provided though the

courtesy of Malcolm Blunt, Debra Conway and Anna Marie Kuhns-Walko.

The ARRB background memo on Army Intelligence in Dallas, the Personnel Roster of the 112th INTC, the personnel list for the Region II group in Dallas, a variety of related Fact Sheets and a copy of the 316th Intelligence Corps Detachment’s Standing Operating Procedures are provided in a reference booklet and CDROM available through JFK Lancer Resource Mail Order. Interviews with group personnel and other related documents are also included.

- (1) ARRB Memorandum, Wray to Gunn; Subject: Army Intelligence in Dallas
 - (2) Department of the Army Unit Lineage and Honors, 112th Military Intelligence Brigade
 - (3) 112th INTC Group Personnel Roster as of 31 January 1963 – Headquarters and Region II/Dallas
 - (4) Fact Sheet on 112th Intelligence Corps
 - (5) Fact Sheet on Protective Services – DOD memo to Committee
 - (6) Fact Sheet on Destruction of Oswald IRR Dossier – DOD memo to Committee
 - (7) 316th Intelligence Corps Detachment; Tactical Standard Operating Procedures
 - (8) Hosty, *Assignment Oswald*; Hosty identifies the 112th member as Edward Coyle
 - (9) Coyle, interview with ARRB, Tim Wray and staff, July 29, 1996
 - (10) Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel from Office of Secretary of the Army, December 11, 1963; Califano Box 6, Folder 10 “Cuban Officer Training Program” memoranda
 - (11) Jones Executive Session testimony to HSCA; April 20, 1978 / RIF 180-10116- 10200
 - (12) Powell FBI Report; January 3, 1964
 - (13) Powell Memorandum for the Record, November 22, 1963
 - (14) Powell Select Committee on Assassinations interview, Basteri/Maxwell, January 1, 1978
 - (15) ARRB Powell Interview transcript, Wray; April 12, 1996
 - (16) Report of the United States Secret Service on the Assassination of President Kennedy; statements by agents Lawson and Sorrels; *JFK Assassination File*, Dallas Police Chief Jesse Currey; DOD statement described on page 184 of HSCA report.
- Note: Chief Currey makes special note that at Love Field, SA Lawson met him immediately before the motorcade and introduced Jack Puterbaugh of the White House staff as well as Army Col. Whitmeyer (no statements are available for Whitmeyer and he was not interviewed by the WC). Both individuals were clearly in the pilot car for the motorcade but SA Lawson makes*

no mention of his assigning them to the vehicle in spite of very detailed remarks about his activities at Love Field (SA Lawson was a former Army Reserve intelligence officer – personal correspondence, Vince Palamara). However, further research suggests that this minor mystery is due to the fact that Col. Whitmeyer was present due to his personal friendship with Chief Lumpkin, that he had ridden down in the pilot car from DPD headquarters and that he was later given an

"official" role in the lead car by the DPD in order to explain his presence – after the fact. (Personal correspondence with Dallas researcher Michael Parks).

(17) "The Secret Service Agent on the Knoll," Debra Conway, *Kennedy Assassination Chronicles* Vol. 6, Issue 4, also online at

<http://www.jfklancker.com/knollagent/>

(18) Spot Report 2200 hours Nov 22 from Lt. Green (Dallas) to Major Dippo (San Antonio); Nov 26 memo to SAC

didn't even see Jackie. I was only interested in seeing President Kennedy. And that's the only person that I saw. And the thought went through my mind as I looked at him just as the motorcade came by what an unusually large head he had for the size of his body. And as soon as the motorcade left, I turned around and walked a half a block up the street, entered the building, and met my boss, Steve Weiss. We rode up the elevator to our office together and he asked me if I had been to lunch and I said, "No." I said, "But I want to drop some stuff off," I said, "and then I can go to lunch." So we went up there and when we walked into the office...the radio was on and the news was on. And all of the sudden, the radio went blank, and it stayed blank for quite awhile and we didn't know what the hell had happened. And...our telephone rang, and I can remember Steve Weiss picking up the telephone, and one of our agents was in the School Book Depository building, and he said that the president had been shot. And Steve Weiss like to went berserk (sic).

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Wray: Do you recall who that agent was?

Coyle: No, I don't.

Wray: Could it have been Sergeant James Powell?

Coyle: It might have been.

Wray: Okay.

Coyle: I'm not sure. But anyhow, he asked us to bring a camera down there because he was going to take some pictures. I can remember one of the things that he said. He felt the shots that got Kennedy came from the grassy knoll, because he saw a lot of people, a lot of skirmishing up there. Okay, so he asked us to get a camera down there. Now, we were only about five blocks from the School Book Depository building. By this time— all of this is happening...let me tell you. The colonel told this kid—he had to pick up the extension in his office, our boss did. He told this kid to make *damn* sure that the president was shot before we passed this information on to higher headquarters.

Wray: Right.

Coyle: So this kid turned around and he hung up the telephone, and he went and he talked to somebody and he called back and told the colonel that definitely the president had been shot and he would like a camera brought

Edward Coyle ARRB Interview July 29, 1996. The Army Intelligence Agent that met with FBI's Hosty the morning of November 2, 1963

FBI San Antonio from ASAC Brooking based on call from Lt. Col. Jones; Nov 27 memo from San Antonio FBI to Dallas SAC and Director based on call from Lt. Col. Jones; Fourth Army cable to U.S. Strike Command, McDill Florida based on intelligence from 112th obtained from Stringfellow of DPD Intelligence unit. (See Scott, *Deep Politics* p 275 for analysis; Strike Command.

(19) Report of Investigation (Military Police), Fort Hood,

Donald Whittier, January 9, 1964.

(20) "The Guns of Dallas," Fletcher L. Prouty, also Prouty in *Gallerie Magazine*.

(21) Transcript of ARRB interview with L. Fletcher Prouty and various internal ARRB memoranda and summary reports.

(22) Transcript of ARRB interview with Col. Rudolph M. Reich (Ret).

112TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
SPOT REPORT (REGION II)

DATE SENT: 22 Nov 63
TIME RECEIVED: 2235 hrs

1. FROM: Region II
2. SPOT REPORT NUMBER: L19
3. SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD
4. REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS REPORTS: L18
5. TIME, DATE, AND PLACE: 2000 to 2200 hrs, 22 Nov 63
6. PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION, OR INSTALLATION INVOLVED: SUBJECT and Dallas Police
7. SUGGORY: The following related to S/s West and Lanyon, Region II by Capt Dowdy, Dallas Police. SUBJECT's wife has signed a statement stating that SUBJECT owned the rifle which is believed to be the weapon that fired the shot that killed President Kennedy and wounded Gov Connally. (this info has not been released to the public) The rifle was manufactured in Italy in 1940 (6.5mm). The police have interviewed a witness who has stated that a man fitting SUBJECT's description in company of another man were observed by this witness on 20 Nov 63 in the immediate vicinity of the place where President Kennedy was killed. These men were observed sighting in a rifle at two silhouette targets. When the police arrived on the scene they realized they were in the direct line of sight so attempted to approach the men by circling around to their rear. When the two officers arrived at the spot where the men were last observed the men had disappeared. The witness further stated that he saw an old model car parked in the vicinity of where the two men were observed with the rifle. The description of the car fits the description of the car that SUBJECT was driving. Witness believes there was a man sitting in the car. (this info has not been released to the public) The slugs that killed President Kennedy and wounded Gov Connally have not been recovered.
8. SIGNIFICANCE AND/OR EFFECT UPON MILITARY INSTALLATION, ACTIVITY,
OR FACILITY: cannot be determined
9. ACTION TAKEN BY REPORTING AGENCY: cont. Lc
10. SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Capt Dowdy
11. EVALUATION (B-2)
12. TIME AND DATE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY REPORTING AGENCY: 2235 hrs, 22 Nov 63
13. COMMENT BY REPORTING AGENCY: Region II agents were cautioned that most of the above info was not public knowledge
14. RELATED REPORTS AND DIRECTIVES: none

DISTRIBUTION:
K
SENT BY: Lt Green
RECEIVED BY: Maj Diemco

document showing Col. Jones' report to Captain "Dowdy" of the DPD (sic) on the silhouette target sighting.